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Abstract [not in printed book]: In many or most instances of paternalism, 
more than one person acts paternalistically, or more than one person is 
treated paternalistically. This chapter discusses some complications that 
arise in such group cases, which are largely ignored in the conceptual 
debate. First, a group of people who together perform an action may do 
so for different reasons, which makes it more challenging to determine 
whether the action is paternalistic. This gives us some reason not to pin 
the property of being paternalistic on actions, since we may alternatively 
pin it on reasons for actions and allow that these differ between members 
in the group. Second, the prevention of harmful consensual interactions 
is sometimes paternalism towards both or all involved, but only if all 
benefit from interference with themselves rather than with other 
members in the group, or if all want the harm or risk (more or less) for 
its own sake. Third, interrelations between three components of 
paternalism - interference, benevolence and consent - gives us reason to 
allow that an action can be paternalistic towards some but not others of  
those affected. This makes it even more difficult, and less relevant, to 
determine whether or not actions are paternalistic. 
 
In the conceptual debate on paternalism, most proposed definitions and 
characterizations have this approximate form: "An agent A behaves/acts 
paternalistically towards a person B, if (and only if)...". The controversy then concerns 
what comes after this phrase, in terms of what sort of action can be paternalistic and 
what is the role of, respectively, A's motives, the possible justifications for A's 
behavior, B's consent or lack thereof, B's general competence and current degree of 
voluntariness, etc. In other words, the discussion presumes, for the most part, that 
paternalism is something that is done by one agent towards one other agent.  
 There are certainly cases of one-on-one paternalism, but in many cases, either 
more than one person acts paternalistically, or more than one person is treated 
paternalistically. Examples include paternalism by governments and organizations, 
paternalism by physicians towards groups of patients, and paternalism by parents or 
teachers towards groups of children. This chapter is focused on such group cases and 
how they differ from one-on-one cases. By a "group" I simply mean any collection of 
more than one person, with no assumptions regarding possible shared interests, 
intentions or other group properties. Groups of individuals in this loose sense 
sometimes together perform an action or are jointly affected by some action.  
 If groups can be understood as normative agents and patients in their own 
right, over and above the individuals they consist of, it seems to me these entities can 
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be paternalists and can be paternalized. It would be interesting to explore 
paternalism by and towards groups in this stronger sense of collective agency and 
patiency, including the relationship between the individual and the group in cases 
where the group is a paternalist or a target of paternalism, but some members are 
not, or vice versa. However, I will not discuss these issues here. Nor will I discuss 
interesting and important issues around discrimination and prejudice towards 
groups - communities, classes, nations, etc. - that can lead to their being paternalized. 
Many issues around group paternalism are under-explored. This chapter is aimed at 
addressing some of these. 
 The chapter has three main parts. The first concerns groups as agents of 
paternalism in relation to a general controversy around whether paternalism resides 
in actions or rather in reasons for actions. The second and third parts concern groups 
as patients of paternalism. The second is focused on prevention of consensual 
interactions that are harmful to at least one party and discusses when such 
prevention is paternalism. The third discusses more generally how one action that 
affects many can have different effects on different people and what this means for 
our analysis of paternalism. [p. 47] 
1. Group paternalists: different people have different reasons  
Paternalism essentially involves some sort of interference or at least involvement 
with its target (merely thinking about someone cannot be paternalistic) and some 
sort of benevolent rationale (affecting someone for purely self-interested reasons is 
not paternalism). There is, in other words, an action component and a reason 
component to paternalism. I will for the most part refer to the action component as 
“interference,” while leaving it open what this should mean exactly. On some 
accounts, quite mild influences are sufficient for actions to be potentially 
paternalistic, and so interfering on my use of the term. I will refer to the reason 
component as “benevolence” or the “benevolent” or simply “paternalism-making” 
rationale.1 
 In this section, I will first discuss a general controversy around defining 
paternalism and then turn to how this controversy is relevant for groups as 
paternalists. The controversy concerns how the two core components of paternalism 
- interference and benevolence - are related. Interference is a property of actions and 
benevolence is a property of reasons. Their interrelation hinges on what sort of thing 
can be paternalistic. The standard and quite dominant view is that this is actions, and, 
perhaps in a derived sense, policies, laws, etc., that are produced by actions 
(influential proponents include Dworkin 1972; Kleinig 1983; VanDeVeer 1986; 
Shiffrin 2000; de Marneffe 2006). On this action-focused view, whether or not an 
action is paternalistic is partly determined by its rationale. There are competing 
accounts of what kind of rationale it is that can make actions paternalistic. The most 
common idea is that motives are paternalism-makers (e.g. VanDeVeer 1986, Shiffrin 
2000), but it is also rather common to point to justification in some sense (e.g. 
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Dworkin 1972). Both types of accounts have some intuitive support. It seems 
paternalistic to force a person into rehab with the motive that this will cure her drug 
addiction, whether or not this is justified and whatever is the justification for it, if 
there is one. On the other hand, it also seems paternalistic to force a person into rehab 
with some other motive and to justify this by invoking the benefit to her. John Kleinig, 
noting this ambiguity in the concept, proposes at one point that we should avoid 
talking about either motives or justifications in this context and instead stick with 
"'having as its rationale', with its explanation/justification ambivalence" (1983: 10). 
This may indicate a disjunctive definition such that an action is paternalistic if it is 
either motivated or justified by benevolence. Peter de Marneffe has proposed, to the 
contrary, a hybrid definition where both motive and justification are required (2006: 
73-74).  
 “Motive” and “justification” are rather vague terms. There are arguably many 
kinds of motives, some conscious and occurrent, some more subtle, nonoccurrent and 
less accessible to the agent. Joel Feinberg distinguishes between "conscious reasons" 
and "deep rationales" (1986: 16). Different psychological theories will divide up the 
terrain differently. When it comes to justifications, it is problematic to define 
paternalism in terms of the normative reasons that in fact count in favor of an 
interference, since whether there are any such reasons depends on the moral status 
of the phenomena the definition is supposed to capture. Anti-paternalists will 
typically hold that we usually have no good or valid reasons for benevolent 
interference. It would be strange if this should cause them to hold that such 
interference is nonpaternalistic (cf. Husak 2003: 392). It is also problematic to bypass 
justification and invoke actual outcomes, since an interference may result in a benefit 
quite unexpectedly, which seems insufficient for making it paternalistic (e.g. you force 
me into rehab, I suffer terribly and return to addiction, but twenty years later the 
experience inspires me to write a bestseller, which makes me very happy). Objectively 
expected outcomes may be more plausible, but this notion needs spelling out and I 
am not aware that anyone has proposed this solution. It makes more sense, therefore, 
to invoke what the paternalist takes to be the normative reasons for her action, 
perhaps mistakenly, which may differ from her motives. There are also, however, the 
normative reasons that agents officially cite, [p. 48] perhaps only rhetorically. Note 
that actual normative reasons can be indirectly relevant since if such reasons are 
identified, agents can then be motivated by them or believe in them or officially point 
to them. When I speak of "justification" in the following, however, I will only refer, 
jointly, to the “taking to be” and the “citing as reason” sense. 
 An alternative to the action-focused view is the reason-focused view. On this 
view, actions cannot be paternalistic, which may seem unintuitive. Instead, what is 
paternalistic is the combination of some reasons and some actions (this view is 
indicated by Kleinig 1983: 12 and by Husak 2003: 390; it is endorsed and defended 
in Grill 2007). This view is motivated by the fact that antipaternalism is typically 
directed at reasons for action rather than at actions themselves. J.S. Mill's Liberty 
Principle, the locus classicus in this context, is not directed at any class of actions, but 
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instead rejects benevolence as an unacceptable "end," "purpose," or "warrant" for 
interference (1859: I.9). An advantage of the reason-focused view is that, unlike the 
action-focused view, it need not distinguish between different kinds of rationales. 
Both the action-focused and the reason-focused view must specify what actions count 
as interfering and what contents of reasons count as benevolent or paternalism-
making. However, only the action-focused view must then go on to say, for any 
combination of benevolent rationales, whether this combination makes the action 
paternalistic. For example, assume A forces B into rehab motivated by benefits to B 
but seeing benefits to others as the justification, and also forces C into rehab 
motivated by benefits to others but seeing benefits to C as the justification. An action-
focused definition of paternalism must be specified so as to determine, for each of 
these actions, whether or not it is paternalistic. The reason-focused view, in contrast, 
will imply that it is paternalistic to be motivated by B's good to force her into rehab, 
and paternalistic to see and/or cite C's good as a reason for forcing C into rehab, while 
neither action is paternalistic as such. 
 I have so far discussed what I have called “kinds” of rationales, divided into 
motives and justifications, each category arguably containing several subcategories, 
with normative reasons a possible third category. That one and the same action often 
has several different kinds of rationales is one complexity faced by anyone who aims 
to determine the status of an action based on its (overall) rationale. Another such 
complexity is that there are also often many rationales of any one kind, differing in 
content or substance. We may, for example, be motivated to force a person into rehab 
both for her own sake and for the sake of her family. On the reason-focused view, it is 
the motives themselves, in combination with the interference that they are motives 
for, that are paternalistic. Hence, one motive for an action can be paternalistic while 
another is not. That there are many rationales of many kinds raises no special 
problems on this view. On the action-focused view, however, we must determine 
whether or not an action that has multiple rationales is paternalistic. Scholars have 
offered different proposals, including that an action is paternalistic if benevolence is 
its only rationale (Gray 1983: 90), its main one (Archard 1990), or even just a 
rationale, however marginal (Bullock 2015).  
 Actions with both paternalism-making and other rationales are sometimes 
called "mixed cases" and treated as a sort of exception. Authors who take this path 
typically go on to focus exclusively on unmixed cases. This leaves it an open question 
how mixed cases, i.e. most actual cases, should be treated. Kleinig has two proposals 
in this regard. One is that actions should be considered paternalistic to the extent that 
their rationales are paternalism-making (Kleinig 1983: 12; also endorsed by Clarke 
2002: 82-83). It is not clear, however, how this should be spelled out. Most obviously, 
the extent to which the rationale for an action is benevolence can be measured either 
in absolute terms - how strong is this rationale taken in isolation? - or in relative terms 
- how strong is this rationale relative to other rationales for the same action? Neither 
of these specifications, however, takes into account how strong a rationale is required 
for the action to be [p. 49] all things considered motivated or justified. On either 
 
Paternalism by and towards groups 
 5 
specification, actions can be quite paternalistic even if they are fully motivated and 
justified by non-benevolent rationales (as argued in Grill 2007: 446-8). Perhaps, 
therefore, “to the extent” should be understood in some kind of relation to how strong 
of a total rationale is required for action, in either motivational or justificational 
terms. Alternatively, as indicated by Kleinig's second proposal (Kleinig 1983: 12; also 
endorsed by de Marneffe 2006: 74), an action can be considered paternalistic if 
benevolence is required for the action to be all things considered motivated, or 
justified, or either motivated or justified, or both motivated and justified. 
 The complexities that arise because actions have multiple rationales (in terms 
of content) and multiple kinds of rationales are aggravated when paternalists are 
groups, because different individuals often have different rationales for their actions. 
Call this the diversity problem. Hundreds of lawmakers in parliament, for example, 
may all vote for the same intrusive law for slightly different reasons, e.g. benefits to 
those intruded upon, benefits to others, environmental benefits, loyalty to one's party, 
advancing one's career, etc. Proposals for when mixed cases are paternalistic can be 
adapted from one-on-one cases to groups, though they may seem (even) less 
appealing in this context. On the strongest account, where benevolence must be the 
only rationale, this will supposedly apply to all members, classifying as 
nonpaternalistic group actions where a single member has some other rationale 
mixed into his set of rationales. On the weakest account, where benevolence need only 
be present as a rationale, it is supposedly sufficient that this rationale is present for a 
single member. On in-between accounts, the threshold for what counts as the “main” 
reason must in group cases be defined in relation to more than one person, raising 
new issues. For example, in determining what is the main rationale for the group, are 
we to go by how many members have benevolence as their main rationale, or are we 
to aggregate some other way, perhaps to take into consideration how strong are 
different members' total rationales for action (e.g. how strongly motivated they are)? 
On the “to the extent” account, similar issues arise concerning how to aggregate over 
members. I see no reason to believe that these issues are unresolvable. The point is 
that this is work that has not been done and that must be done before the various 
proposals can be applied to group cases. 
 The diversity problem is noted by Douglas Husak in the context of legal 
paternalism (Husak 2003: 389-91). Husak also notes that it is difficult to know what 
motivates lawmakers and that laws remain in place over time and so the same law 
can be supported for different reasons as times change (2003: 391). Because of these 
problems, Husak considers something like the reason-focused view. However, despite 
many reservations, he insists in the end that laws can be paternalistic, and suggests 
that, because of the problems with motives, we should go by a law's "best rationale" 
(2003: 392).2 However, as Husak admits, this view has the general problem, described 
above, that it will classify all actions and laws as nonpaternalistic if benevolence is in 
fact never a good normative reason for interference. This could possibly be avoided 
by referring, not to actual reasons, but instead to facts that would be reasons in other 
contexts, such that the “best rationale” for an action is the rationale that would be 
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best, if, counterfactually, protection and promotion of a person's interests provided 
as strong normative reasons for interference as they in fact do for responding to 
requests for help, or some such construction. 
 More to the point, it is not obvious that invoking actual normative reasons will 
avoid the diversity problem, since each member of a group may contribute in a 
different way to some group action and may each have different reasons for their 
respective contributions. Consider the case where A, B and C each contribute to 
building a wall that will protect D from foolishly balancing on the edge of a cliff. 
Perhaps A raises the funds, B makes the plans, and C does [p. 50] the actual 
construction. They may all correctly believe that the immediate outcome of their joint 
action - that there will be a wall - is a good thing because it reduces the risk of harm 
to D. However, their main and sufficient actual normative reasons for contributing 
may not be the effect on D, but rather, e.g., that they have promised to contribute, that 
they will themselves be morally better people for contributing, or that contributing 
will bring them resources - salaries, reputation - that will enable good deeds in the 
future (feeding their children, building greater walls). Depending on one's general 
normative views, it may or may not be the case that we always have some reason to 
contribute, when we can, to other people's welfare, e.g. by reducing risk to them. If we 
don't, A, B and C may each have no benevolent reason whatsoever to build the wall. If 
we do, the benevolent reason they have may be relatively weak, and redundant. 
Though having a redundant benevolent motive may possibly taint an action as 
paternalistic on motivational accounts, it seems extreme to hold that redundant 
normative reasons make actions paternalistic. Therefore, it may be true for each of A, 
B or C that the rationale for their action, such as it counts in this context, is 
nonbenevolent. It may of course also be that their rationale is benevolent, and so the 
diversity problem remains unsolved. 
 We could set aside individual reasons and look more generally at the reasons 
for, e.g., there being a wall. Indeed, this approach is common when discussing laws; 
there are supposed to be reasons for and against laws as such, supposedly for and 
against their existence. Husak expresses himself this way, as does Joel Feinberg. For 
Feinberg, laws are paternalistic if their "implicit rationale" is benevolent. This is, 
Feinberg explains, a sort of general understanding regarding the function of the law, 
explaining why it remains in place (1986: 17). I think we do best to interpret talk of 
practical reasons for other things than actions as shorthand for reasons for actions, 
such as introducing a bill or voting for it, or financing, planning or constructing a wall. 
If we allow ourselves to talk non-reductively of reasons for such things as the 
existence of laws and of infrastructure, it is unclear how this bears on agents and their 
reasons. With paternalism in particular, with its strong connection to interpersonal 
relationships, motivations and attitudes, jettisoning this connection is quite radical. 
 On the reason-focused view, diversity does not pose as much of a problem, since 
it can be accommodated by counting as paternalism any combination of interfering 
actions and benevolent rationales for those actions, rationales of any kind (motives, 
justifications, etc.). When A and B together force C into rehab, for example, A’s motive 
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may be to help C, while his justification is to protect C's family (who are innocent, 
more vulnerable, etc.). B, on the other hand, is more motivated by concern for C's 
family, but his justification is to help C with his drug problem (since he suffers the 
most, etc.). Depending on the details of a reason-focused view, it may be that, in 
relation to the interfering action, A’s motive but not his justification is paternalistic, 
while B’s justification but not his motive is paternalistic. The example is a simple one, 
however, and for more complex cases, the reason-focused view will imply that 
paternalism is sprinkled over a vast net of actions and reasons, making for a very long 
and complicated answer to the question “is this paternalism?”. 
 Before I go on to discuss paternalism towards groups, in the next section, I will 
briefly note one complication that does not directly have to do with reasons for action. 
In the example with the building of the wall, three different agents have different 
reasons for action. However, they also contribute differently to the collective action 
of “building the wall.” It is not obvious that all contributions amount to interference. 
Perhaps just raising the funds for the project is not interfering, or perhaps just doing 
the work that is ordered by someone else is not interfering. More generally, someone 
could perhaps contribute to an outcome that seems, on the face of it, to involve 
interference, without thereby interfering herself. Perhaps in such cases, the 
interference can only be found on the level of collective agency, just as with collective 
actions that seem [p. 51] benevolent though none of the contributing agents act 
benevolently. If so, this is a complication for both the action-focused and the reason-
focused views, since both presume an account of interfering action. 
2. Paternalized groups I: preventing consensual interactions 
The discussion so far has been focused on paternalist groups. All issues that I have 
discussed can arise whether the paternalized is one person or several. In this section 
and the next, I will focus on actions that target groups, whether or not the agent is an 
individual or a group. Such actions can be interfering for some and not for others, and 
can be benevolent towards some and not others. Therefore, not all cases I will discuss 
are cases of group paternalism. Instead, one of my aims is to clarify which cases are 
and in what sense. As part of my discussion I will refer to concrete examples, such as 
drug regulation, and assume that the prevented activity, such as buying and using 
drugs, is indeed harmful. I make this assumption only for the sake of argument, since 
interactions that are not harmful to anyone should rather obviously not be interfered 
with and so are not very interesting to discuss. I will throughout speak of “harm” and 
“benefit” as outcomes, with the understanding that how these outcomes are relevant 
to paternalism depends on one's view of the reason component - actual outcomes may 
provide normative reasons, believed outcomes may be motivating and invoked as 
justification, etc. 
 I emphasized above that there can be several rationales, with different content, 
for the same interfering action. This can be because there is more than one reason to 
interfere with the same person, e.g. both to promote her well-being and to respond to 
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a request for help from her. More often, however, it is due to effects on more than one 
person. If we interfere with two persons who are doing something that will harm one 
of them, we may be interfering with one to prevent harm to self and with the other to 
prevent harm to others. Sometimes, as Gerald Dworkin explains, "in trying to protect 
the welfare of a class of persons we find that the only way to do so will involve 
restricting the freedom of other persons besides those who are benefitted" (1972: 
68). Dworkin labels such cases "impure paternalism," where the impurity is the 
interference with some other party, in addition to the beneficiary.3  
 The standard case of impure paternalism is interference with consensual 
interactions, and in particular with such interactions as are harmful to one of the 
parties and not the other. Examples include such extraordinary interactions as 
consenting to being abused or killed, and selling oneself into slavery. More practically 
relevant examples include selling sexual services and buying unhealthy consumer 
goods, such as recreational drugs. Interference will benefit the party that is harmed 
in its absence. There is presumably no benefit to the other party, e.g. the seller of 
drugs or the buyer of sex. Therefore, assuming the beneficiary is a single individual, 
this is not a group case. Interference with other parties is just a means, perhaps a 
necessary means, to producing the benefit. These parties are not themselves thereby 
paternalized. It is an interesting question whether we have any reason to regret, for 
the sake of the harming party, interference with actions that harm consenting others 
- such as selling them drugs. This issue, however, is independent of issues to do with 
paternalism. 
 In many typical cases of impure paternalism, such as prohibition of the sale of 
unhealthy products, the interference is most obvious with the nonbeneficiary, i.e. the 
seller (who may be prosecuted and punished). However, what makes the case one of 
paternalism is that there is also interference with the buyer, who is prevented from 
acquiring the desired good or service. As Feinberg argues, if others are prevented 
from selling me what I want to buy, or aiding me [p. 52] in my pursuits, then I am 
interfered with and my freedom is limited (Feinberg 1986: 9). Or, in Mill's words:  
 
there are questions relating to interference with trade, which are essentially 
questions of liberty [...] where the object of the interference is to make it 
impossible or difficult to obtain a particular commodity. These interferences 
are objectionable, not as infringements on the liberty of the producer or seller, 
but on that of the buyer. (1859: V.4)  
 
 Some authors describe as impure or "indirect" paternalism cases where they 
claim there is no interference with the beneficiary/buyer, but only with the 
nonbeneficiary/seller (Pope 2003: 687-88; Le Grand & New 2015: 37). If this was a 
form of paternalism, it would perhaps be a special kind of group case, involving two 
different members in quite different roles - one is interfered with and another 
benefits. However, it is unclear what the paternalism would consist of in such cases. 
Interference with one person in order to benefit another person is the standard 
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contrast class to paternalism (preventing assault has this structure). If there is indeed 
no interference with the buyer, then, I propose, there is no paternalism, but only 
interference to prevent harm to others (Bayles 1973 and Hansson 2005 argue that 
many prohibitions of consensual interactions should be understood in this way).  
 Here, I should make an exception to my loose use of “interference” and 
acknowledge that some authors offer very wide understandings of interference, or, in 
other words, reject the assumption that paternalism is interfering. For example, Cass 
Sunstein and Richard Thaler claim that it is sufficient that there is an attempt to 
"influence choices" (Sunstein and Thaler 2003: 1162) and Danny Scoccia claims that 
any benevolent influence on another via "nonrational means" is paternalistic (Scoccia 
2013: 76, as well as his chapter in this volume). Such actions may not warrant the 
label “interference.” In the present context, however, what is important is that 
however we specify the action component of paternalism, actions belonging to this 
type must be directed at the beneficiary for there to be paternalism. It is not sufficient 
that some other person is the target of such an action. If we require coercion, then 
there must be coercion towards the beneficiary. If we require only influence on 
choice, then there must be influence on the choice of the beneficiary.  
 Some harmful consensual interactions are symmetrical in the sense that both 
or all parties harm each other and also consent to being harmed. Boxing is the 
traditional example, mixed martial arts competitions a more recent one. A street fight 
with willing participants is a more clear-cut example, without the commercial and 
institutional context. Benevolently interfering with consensual fighting may seem a 
clear example of paternalism, since there is both interference with and benefit to all 
members of the group. However, the details are somewhat intricate. Suppose that in 
a group consisting of A, B and C, A wants to punch B, B wants to punch C and C wants 
to punch A. If D prevents any punching from occurring by separating A, B, and C, this 
seems clearly to interfere with each of them by stopping them from punching the 
person they want to punch, while also benefitting each of them by protecting them 
from being punched. However, such prevention does not seem paternalistic because 
no person benefits from the interference with her (assuming they are not harmed by 
delivering a punch). They all benefit from the interference with other people, from 
which they are protected.  
 Now consider a street fight with two willing participants, perhaps supporters 
of opposing sports clubs who take pride in fighting "for their team." We could claim 
that keeping these brawlers apart prevents A from fighting B, for B’s sake, and 
prevents B from fighting A, for A’s sake, hence benefitting each party only by 
interference with the other. However, this seems less [p. 53] plausible than in the 
three party case, since both A and B want the same thing to happen - for there to be a 
fight between the two of them. They want this, let us assume, because they consider 
the risk of harm a fair price to pay for the thrill and the social recognition they get 
from fighting. Like the willing buyer of drugs or seller of sex, each brawler invites 
another person to (potentially) harm him. Like in these other cases, therefore, the 
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freedom of each brawler is limited by preventing him from engaging in a harmful 
consensual interaction.  
 I have argued that interference in the two party brawling case is paternalistic 
while interference in the three party punching case is not. Let me expand on the 
relevant difference. It is not that the two brawlers would object to interference. The 
three punchers too may object, because they value the opportunity to punch the 
person they want to punch more than they value the protection from being punched. 
The relevant difference is not in the numbers either. Two people may both want the 
other to suffer a punch, more than they want to be protected from being punched 
themselves, and so be opposed to interference. I believe interference in these 
variations on the punching case would not be paternalism. The important distinction 
is, I believe, between two sorts of cases: first, those where a person wants some harm 
or risk of harm for its own sake, or where this harm or risk is integral to what he 
wants, as in the brawling case - part of what the brawlers take pride in is exactly to 
risk harm "for their team" - and, second, those where a person is prepared to accept 
some harm or risk of harm in order to get something that he wants more than to avoid 
this harm or risk, such as to inflict harm on someone else. In the former cases, 
prevention is interference with the person who wants the harm or risk. In the latter 
case, prevention is interference only with the source of the harm or risk and not with 
the person who is prepared to accept it. This distinction is relevant only when the 
source of harm or risk is another agent (and probably only when that agent causes 
harm or risk intentionally). When the source of harm is the person herself, we can 
(normally) protect her only by interfering with her, which is paternalism.4 
 Special considerations apply when a person is opposed to being protected by 
others, even if she does not want the harm or risk that may result from being 
unprotected. Scoccia (2013: 81) notes that some people are "committed to an extreme 
ideal of self-reliance" and therefore oppose benevolent interference even with their 
own substantially involuntary action. People may for similar reasons oppose 
benevolent interference even with their own attackers -  they want to "fight their own 
battles." The state of being unprotected, or independent, is one to which risk is an 
integral aspect - it is just this risk that one does not want others to remove. I therefore 
propose that interference with committedly self-reliant people is paternalism.   
 Similar considerations apply when interferences with consensual interactions 
are coordinated through systems, institutions or laws. A law that prevents people 
from harming themselves, or from soliciting the aid of others in harming themselves, 
involves paternalism (i.e. implementing it, or doing so for certain reasons, may be 
paternalistic). As for a law that prevents people from harming others without their 
consent, but that is universally opposed, whether or not it involves paternalism 
depends on whether the opposition is based on a desire for self-reliance, or on a 
desire for the opportunity to harm others. In other words, it depends on whether 
people want to be unprotected themselves, or whether they want others to be 
unprotected. In many cases, of course, members of a group will have different aims, 
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opinions and ideals. This and other differences between individuals is the topic of the 
next section. 
3. Paternalized groups II: different effects on different people 
In this section, I will first note and illustrate how one action can affect different people 
differently in ways relevant to paternalism. I will then move on to discuss how this 
may influence our [p. 54] classification of various cases as paternalistic. The relevant 
differences concern, first, the two core components of paternalism already identified: 
who is interfered with and who benefits. A third relevant difference is also a third 
component of paternalism: the will component. Benevolent interferences are 
typically considered paternalistic only when they are against the will of the target, i.e. 
when unwelcome or not consented to. This component is arguably not essential since 
it can be integrated into the action component such that an action counts as 
interfering only if it is not consented to. However, it is typically treated as a separate 
component and I started to treat it as such towards the end of the previous section, in 
considering whether interference with brawling and punching would be objected to.  
 For there to be paternalism, then, an action must be unwelcome, interfering and 
benevolent. However, I argued in the previous section that this is not sufficient, 
because sometimes the benevolence towards one person is not connected to the 
interference with her, as when the three punchers are all prevented from harming 
each other. What is relevant is not whether the action is benevolent, but whether the 
interference is benevolent. It can also be questioned whether an unwelcome 
benevolent interference with a person is paternalistic towards her if her objection is 
not connected to the interference with her (e.g., A stops B and C from daring each 
other into jumping off a cliff; both B and C object to A's interference; B does not want 
to jump and would not object but for the fact that she really wants C to jump). There 
are, potentially, interconnections between the three components and these 
connections can be different for different people affected by the same action. This 
indicates that we should allow, as I started to do in the previous section, that one and 
the same action can involve paternalism towards some and not towards others. This 
indicates important modifications of both the action-focused and the reason-focused 
view, as both of these otherwise deal only in actions and not their diverse effects on 
different people. On the reason-focused view, the modification can be integrated by 
holding that what is paternalistic is not combinations of actions and their rationales, 
but rather combinations of rationales and (unwelcome) interferences with particular 
people. This makes for an even more complex but arguably more accurate analysis of 
paternalism in group cases. On the action-focused view, similarly, the modification 
could be taken to imply that what is paternalistic is not in fact actions but rather 
interferences with particular people.  
 Feinberg (1986: 20) discusses this modification and dismisses it as "an 
unnecessary relativizing of the concept” of paternalism. However, his discussion of 
group cases is quite limited, as I will soon explain. Given the mentioned 
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interconnections and also given the general individualism inherent in the liberal 
tradition, it makes much sense to base analysis of paternalism towards groups on the 
effects on individual members.  
 I will now survey some examples of actions towards groups that are 
paternalistic towards some members but where one of the three components of 
paternalism is missing in relation to other members. First, missing benefits: 
prevention of consensual interactions that are harmful to only one party is one sort 
of case; another is the subjection of a group to a measure that protects only those that 
are vulnerable to some harm. An example is removing the sleeping pills or cigarettes 
from a shared home, benefitting the cohabitant who is suicidal or a habitual smoker, 
but only harming the cohabitant who is neither of these things but sometimes has 
trouble sleeping or enjoys a single cigarette. Just as for prevention of consensual 
interactions, only the interference with the beneficiary is paternalistic. The 
interference with nonbeneficiaries is a sort of collateral damage.5 Unlike some cases 
of preventing consensual interactions, those that suffer this damage are not harming 
anyone or doing anything morally problematic, and so the interference with them 
must be considered a negative.  
 Second, missing interference: speed limits supposedly benefit drivers by 
reducing the risk of accident for them, but also of course reduce risks for cyclists and 
pedestrians Even if pedestrians [p. 55] (who never drive) are included among the 
intended beneficiaries, and even if they are for some reason opposed to the 
regulation, it is not paternalistic towards them because it does not interfere with 
them. 
 Third, missing objection: many people appreciate that product safety 
legislation prevents them from buying unsafe machinery or consumer goods. Others 
oppose such restriction of their freedom, on either pragmatic or principled grounds. 
Libertarian chainsaw buyers are paternalized by the state, while most other 
customers are not.    
 There is very little discussion in the literature of how, on the dominant action-
focused view, we should classify the surveyed examples. However, a number of 
influential contributions in the 1980s converge on a view we may call the willing 
majority view: for actions that interfere with and benefit all members of a group, if a 
majority consents and the action is motivated by its benefits to them, then the action 
is not paternalistic, though it may be unfair to nonconsenters (Arneson 1980: 471-2; 
Dworkin 1983: 110; Feinberg 1986: 20). The view is motivated by discussion of such 
cases as the prohibition on dueling and the fluoridation of drinking water, where a 
large majority favors the policy and it is implemented for their sakes. The willing 
majority view can be specified to different motivational accounts (one motive, main 
motive, only motive, implicit rationale, etc.) and can be transformed into a 
justificational account by substituting, e.g., “taken to be justified” or “claimed to be 
justified” for “motivated.” The view still draws scholarly support (e.g., Le Grand & New 
2015: 21-22).  
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 The willing majority view says that, in some cases where the rationale for an 
action is to benefit a majority of those affected and where this majority is not 
paternalized, the action is not paternalistic. However, the view is restricted to cases 
where all those affected are both interfered with and benefitted and where the reason 
the majority is not paternalized is that they consent. This is the third of the cases just 
surveyed - missing objection. The spirit of the view, however, indicates that its 
proponents would not mind a generalization that incudes also missing benefit and 
missing interference.  
 The willing majority view categorizes actions based on their different effects on 
different people. Given the idea that paternalism actually resides in interferences with 
particular people and not in actions, the view may seem superfluous. If we know that 
an action is an unwelcome benevolent interference with A and with B but not with C, 
it is not clear what additional information is conveyed by saying that the action itself 
is or is not paternalistic. Those nevertheless committed to pinning the predicate 
“paternalism” on actions have some work to do. Even the generalized willing majority 
view is applicable only to actions that are nonpaternalistic towards a majority. A 
simple addition would be to categorize as paternalistic those actions that are 
paternalistic towards a majority. However, the 50% cut-off point seems arbitrary. It 
might also seem that factors other than sheer numbers could be relevant, such as the 
size of the benefits involved. Suppose that the prohibition of some rare and dangerous 
drug will marginally reduce the already very low risk that the majority ever confront 
this drug. The prohibition is introduced and the majority welcomes it for this reason. 
However, the prohibition will also drastically reduce the high risk of drug abuse and 
ensuing harm to some minority, who are opposed to prohibition. This prohibition will 
count as nonpaternalistic on plausible specifications of the willing majority view, 
which may seem counter-intuitive (on the importance of relative benefits to group 
consent, see Grill 2009: 151-53). 
 A further problem with the willing majority view is that it disregards the 
reasons for why people consent to interference with a group to which they belong, as 
briefly indicated above. Proponents tend to assume that the consenters consent out 
of self-interest, but they may instead be altruistically motivated, consenting for the 
sake of the nonconsenters, whom they see as failing to act in their own best interest. 
This raises the question whether altruistic consent renders [p. 56] interference 
nonpaternalistic towards consenters. In addition, given that some people's altruistic 
consent makes blanket interference more likely, these people seem to be using their 
consent to indirectly paternalize nonconsenters. If the consenters are in the majority, 
the willing majority view would categorize the interfering action as nonpaternalistic. 
This seems very questionable. We could modify the view to require a majority of self-
interested consenters, but there are many additional issues to consider, such as how 
to count members who consent partly for self-interested and partly for altruistic 
reasons, and how to count liberally minded altruists who do not consent, in order to 
protect consenters whom they see as failing to give proper priority to their own 
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liberty and independence (on these and other issues around group consent, see 
further Grill 2009). 
 Before I conclude, let me briefly mention a fourth potentially relevant 
difference in how people are affected by the same action: who, among those interfered 
with, is acting voluntarily or competently. Though it has been convincingly challenged 
(Hanna 2011), it is a quite dominant position that unwelcome benevolent 
interference is not morally problematic, or much less so, when and because it is 
directed at choices or actions that are below some threshold of voluntariness. 
Following Feinberg, such interference is often called “soft paternalism.” If some of 
those interfered with are below the threshold and some not, this situation is 
analogous to that when only some group members are interfered with or benefitted 
or objecting, though now the difference is not between paternalism and 
nonpaternalism, but between hard paternalism and soft paternalism. We could then 
either be content to determine for each paternalized member of the group whether 
the paternalism towards her is hard or soft, or we could identify some rule for 
whether or not the interfering action is soft or hard paternalistic, which should be 
suitably sensitive to differences among group members. 
Conclusion 
Though examples of paternalism in the conceptual and normative debate often 
include groups both as paternalists and as paternalized, the interesting and difficult 
issues that groups raise are seldom explicitly discussed or analyzed. What little has 
been said in the literature on paternalism by and towards groups is quite cursory. The 
topic deserves more thorough treatment. I have focused in this chapter on some 
issues that arise from the mere fact that more than one person is either paternalizing 
or being paternalized, setting to one side issues to do with collective agency and 
patiency in any stronger sense.  
 In section 1, I presented the action-focused and reason-focused views on 
paternalism and explained how groups as paternalists complicate both views but 
provide greater challenges for the action-focused view, on which actions must 
somehow be categorized as either paternalistic or nonpaternalistic based on the often 
rich and diverse total rationale for group interference. 
 In section 2, I argued that standard cases of impure paternalism are not 
paternalism towards groups because they only benefit (or are only believed to 
benefit) one party. I also argued that if they do not interfere with the beneficiary, they 
are not paternalism at all. I went on to consider interferences with people who 
mutually harm each other and argued that these are paternalistic only if the affected 
people benefit via interference with themselves, not others. I proposed that 
interference with two or more people bent on harming each other can be paternalism 
if they seek to be harmed or put themselves at risk of harm, or if they seek an activity 
where such harm or risk is an integral aspect. In other cases, interference is not 
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paternalistic, even if objections to interference may have normative significance in 
other ways. 
 In section 3, I argued that, because of interrelations between the three 
components of paternalism - interference, benevolence, and will - we should 
understand paternalism in terms [p. 57] of unwelcome benevolent interferences with 
particular people, rather than in terms of actions, which may paternalize some and 
not others (when an action only affects one person, we need not distinguish between 
interference and action). This shift from action to interference holds for both the 
action-focused and the reason-focused view. There may be a connection between this 
shift and the controversy between action-focus and reason-focus in that, if we give up 
trying to pin the predicate “paternalistic” on actions, we may as well accept the 
reason-focused view, modified to deal in reasons for interferences rather than 
reasons for action.6 
Related Topics 
Hard and Soft Paternalism; Libertarian Paternalism, Nudging and Public Policy; 
Paternalism and the Criminal Law; Perfectionism and Paternalism; The Concept of 
Paternalism. 
Notes
1 Shiffrin (2000) is an exception to the near consensus that paternalism essentially involves 
the protection or promotion of the interests of the person interfered with. Shiffrin clearly 
states that the paternalism-making rationale can be the improvement of things under a 
person's control that are not, strictly speaking, her interests. However, she seems to presume 
that the rationale must be benevolent in some sense. Presumably, she would not categorize 
as paternalist interference that is solely motivated by self-interest, or by sheer malice. I will 
throughout use standard examples that do not cohere with Shiffrin's view, but which can be 
reformulated so that they do. 
2 The difficulty with group motives has been noted more often in the context of liberal 
neutrality. Neutrality can fruitfully be understood in terms of a constraint on what reasons 
may be invoked for political decisions (e.g. Larmore 1987: 44; Wall 1998: chap. 2; de 
Marneffe 2010: chap. 5, esp. 134). Antipaternalism can similarly be understood in terms of 
what reasons may be invoked for interference (Grill 2015). So understood, neither of these 
liberal “-isms” is dependent on classifying actions or laws as non-neutral or paternalistic.  
3 Feinberg complains that "impure" sounds like "a watered down sort" of paternalism and 
proposes to use "indirect" instead (Feinberg 1984: 9). Both terms are used, sometimes with 
the same meaning and sometimes with slightly different meanings.  
4 This analysis of consensual fighting partly contradicts that in my (2007: 453-55). A note on 
terminology: In my (2007) I speak of different effects of actions in the abstract, noting that 
effects can be individuated by what person is affected but leaving it open that other factors 
may also be relevant. This framework may sometimes be useful, but here, for ease of 
presentation, I bypass talk of effects in general and speak only of interference with and 
paternalism towards different people.  
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5 If interfering with nonbeneficiaries is "the only way" to attain the benefit to the 
beneficiaries, then these cases are impure paternalism on Dworkin's characterization. 
However, this concept is usually only associated with interference with consensual 
interactions. 
6 Thanks to Jason Hanna and Lars Samuelsson for very helpful comments on more than one 
draft. 
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